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Abstract
Caldwell hypothesized in 1980 that the onset of the fertility transition would
be linked with the achievement of “mass formal schooling.” In sub-Saharan Africa, a
region where some countries have begun the fertility transition but many have not,
the extent of progress toward mass schooling has not yet been assessed. This paper
fills a gap in the literature using newly available Demographic and Health Survey
data to assess schooling patterns and trends for 17 sub-Saharan countries. As back-
ground to that assessment, the paper includes a literature review, an overview of the
recent history of African education, and an evaluation of alternative sources of data
on education. These data are linked to recent markers of fertility change in order to assess
the potential importance of mass schooling for the fertility transition in Africa.
In most of Africa, the promise embodied in early postindependence educa-
tional progress whereby the next generation of Africans would be universally ex-
posed to basic levels of formal schooling has yet to be realized. Countries such as
Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbab-
we are the exceptions rather than the rule, and most of these had achieved some form
of mass schooling by the early 1980s. Since 1980, growth rates in educational par-
ticipation and attainment have slowed or halted; in some countries, they have begun
to decline. Most of these same countries were in the forefront of the fertility transi-
tion in Africa; in Ghana and Tanzania, fertility declines have begun more recently. A
systematic empirical analysis of cross-country patterns across all 17 countries sup-
ports Caldwell’s hypothesis. Within this group, however, we find a few countries
beginning to show signs of fertility transition despite limited progress in mass school-
ing. Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal are notable examples of this new development. In
countries where population growth rates remain high and a growing proportion of
the population is of school age, the achievement of mass schooling will be increas-
ingly difficult in the future if high fertility persists. Therefore, if fertility declines are
to continue, or in some cases begin, they will have to do so in the absence of mass
schooling. Instead, fertility may respond to other vehicles of communication, such
as the mass media, which will be increasingly pervasive, providing alternative mecha-
nisms for the spread of cultural change.
Caldwell (1980) hypothesized that the onset of the fertility transition would be
linked with the achievement of “mass formal schooling,” by which he meant near-
universal enrollment of children in primary or basic schooling. In sub-Saharan Africa, a
region in which the fertility transition has begun in some countries but not in others, this
hypothesis remains untested. In all of these countries, formal schooling is a foreign
import, imposed in a variety of different ways over the last century by colonial regimes
and foreign churches. In more recent years, as former colonies have gained their inde-
pendence, most governments have made significant budgetary commitments to educa-
tion, and educational systems have been revised and reformed to serve the goals of
independent states. Today, the educational systems arrayed across the African continent
show enormous variation, with many retaining strong links to their colonial roots. Some
countries have achieved near-universal enrollment at the primary-school level, but most
have not. In some, the gender gap in enrollment rates remains large despite significant
progress, but in most, substantial progress has been made to close that gap. Further-
more, recent setbacks in enrollment in response to rising school costs, brought on in
many cases by governmental responses to economic reversals and to structural adjust-
ment conditions, add complexity to considerations of the fertility implications of educa-
tional transitions.
The primary focus of this paper is on schooling patterns and trends in sub-Saharan
Africa. Despite constant references in the demographic literature to the importance of
education, considerable ignorance persists about actual enrollment trends or schooling
conditions and about the state policies that lie behind them. The most widely used statis-
tical indicator of educational participation produced by the United Nations Educational,
Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)—the gross enrollment ratio—is fun-
damentally flawed and misleading. To measure the extent of participation in school,
consistent data from a census or a survey are necessary for estimating the proportion of
a particular age cohort that has ever been to school or that has attained a certain level of
schooling. Meaningful rates of educational participation that can be compared across
countries and over time cannot be derived, as are gross enrollment ratios, from enroll-
ment reports provided by schools and district offices. In a world of shrinking budgets
and rapidly growing school-aged populations, educational institutions have substantial
incentive to inflate their numbers to protect their share of government resources. Unfor-
tunately, despite considerable investment by the United Nations (UN) in training for
4African censuses conducted in the 1980s and 1990s, little of the extensive census data
collected has become accessible for further analysis within the UN system or even for
country nationals’ use.1  A substantial investment over the last two rounds of the Demo-
graphic and Health Survey (DHS) Program in the collection of basic data on education
in the household surveys now provides an opportunity to study educational patterns and
trends on a fully comparable basis for the first time. These data also can be compared
with UNESCO enrollment data and, for some countries, with published census data,
thus providing greater insight into educational patterns and trends and into issues of data
quality. The assessment of recent schooling patterns and postindependence trends based
on DHS data is, therefore, the main contribution of this paper.
The motivation for undertaking this assessment is the authors’ interest in contrib-
uting to the literature on African transitions, both demographic and otherwise. State
educational policies, which affect not only the accessibility, price, and quality of formal
schooling but also the extent to which participation is voluntary, represent a critical
dimension of the economics of family building in all societies as well as a primary
means of socialization by the state. In Africa, where many fertility transitions have not
yet begun or are just beginning, the spread of education has not yet been assessed in any
comprehensive way.
The paper reviews the literature concerning the links between education—par-
ticularly the mass schooling of the young—and fertility in developing countries, with a
particular emphasis on recent African experience. The evolution of formal schooling in
Africa is described, beginning with its colonial roots and continuing with policies and
programs of the state in the postindependence era. After a brief discussion of the advan-
tages and disadvantages of different sources of data on school enrollment and attain-
ment, empirical findings on progress toward mass schooling are presented. Although
data from all countries in the region cannot be presented, a sample of 17 countries is
included with appropriate data on education from western, eastern, and southern Africa,
representing different colonial traditions and postindependence educational policies (see
Table 1).2  In operationalizing the concept of mass schooling, various dimensions of formal
education are considered, including its depth, as measured by years of attainment and pri-
mary completion; its degree of gender equity; its spread from urban to rural areas; and
Ta
bl
e 
1
Se
le
ct
ed
 c
ha
ra
ct
er
ist
ic
s o
f 1
7 
su
b-
Sa
ha
ra
n 
co
un
tri
es
Po
pu
la
tio
n
Pe
rc
en
t r
es
id
in
g 
in
TF
R
 (w
om
en
D
at
e
D
at
e 
of
(m
illi
on
s)a
u
rb
an
 a
re
a
sb
a
ge
d 
15
-4
9)c
o
f D
H
S
C
ou
nt
ry
C
ol
on
iz
ed
 b
y
in
de
pe
nd
en
ce
19
95
19
70
19
80
19
90
19
88
–9
7
su
rv
ey
B
ot
sw
an
a
G
re
at
 B
rit
ai
n
19
66
1.
3
8.
4
15
.1
41
.5
4.
9
19
88
B
ur
ki
na
 F
as
o
Fr
an
ce
19
60
10
.2
5.
7
8.
5
13
.6
6.
9
19
93
Ca
m
er
oo
n
G
re
at
 B
rit
ai
n/
Fr
an
ce
19
60
13
.2
20
.3
31
.4
40
.3
5.
2d
19
98
Cô
te
 d
’Iv
oi
re
Fr
an
ce
19
60
14
.1
27
.4
34
.8
40
.4
5.
7d
19
94
G
ha
na
G
re
at
 B
rit
ai
n
19
57
17
.4
29
.0
31
.2
33
.9
4.
5d
19
98
K
en
ya
G
re
at
 B
rit
ai
n
19
63
28
.2
10
.3
16
.1
24
.1
4.
7
19
98
M
ad
ag
as
ca
r
Fr
an
ce
19
60
14
.7
14
.1
18
.3
23
.5
6.
0
19
97
M
al
aw
i
G
re
at
 B
rit
ai
n
19
64
11
.1
6.
0
9.
1
11
.8
6.
7
19
92
M
al
i
Fr
an
ce
19
60
10
.7
14
.3
18
.5
23
.8
6.
7
19
95
–9
6
N
am
ib
ia
G
er
m
an
y/
So
ut
h 
A
fri
ca
19
90
1.
5
18
.6
22
.8
31
.0
5.
4
19
92
N
ig
er
ia
G
re
at
 B
rit
ai
n
19
60
11
0.
4
20
.0
26
.9
35
.0
6.
0
19
90
Se
ne
ga
l
Fr
an
ce
19
60
8.
3
33
.4
35
.9
40
.4
5.
7
19
97
So
ut
h 
A
fri
ca
G
re
at
 B
rit
ai
n
19
10
41
.4
47
.8
48
.1
48
.8
4.
0d
19
87
–8
9
Ta
n
za
n
ia
G
er
m
an
y/
G
re
at
 B
rit
ai
n
19
61
29
.6
6.
7
14
.8
20
.8
5.
8
19
96
U
ga
nd
a
G
re
at
 B
rit
ai
n
19
62
21
.0
8.
0
8.
8
11
.2
6.
9
19
95
Za
m
bi
a
G
re
at
 B
rit
ai
n
19
64
8.
2
30
.2
39
.8
42
.0
6.
1
19
96
Zi
m
ba
bw
e
G
re
at
 B
rit
ai
n
19
80
11
.2
16
.9
22
.3
28
.4
4.
3
19
94
a S
ou
rc
e:
 
 
U
ni
te
d 
N
at
io
ns
 (1
99
8a
).
b S
ou
rc
e:
 
U
ni
te
d 
N
at
io
ns
 (1
99
8b
).
c S
ou
rc
es
: 
In
di
vi
du
al
 D
H
S 
co
un
try
 re
po
rts
 fo
r a
ll 
co
un
tri
es
 b
ut
 S
ou
th
 A
fri
ca
.  
Fo
r
So
ut
h 
A
fri
ca
, M
os
te
rt 
(19
90
).  
Ex
ce
pt 
wh
ere
 ot
he
rw
ise
 in
dic
ate
d, 
tot
al 
fer
til
ity
 ra
te 
(T
FR
) i
s c
alc
ula
ted
 fo
r t
he
 th
ree
 ye
ars
 be
fo
re
 th
e 
su
rv
ey
.
 
 
d  
B
as
ed
 o
n
60
 m
on
th
s p
rio
r t
o 
su
rv
ey
.
6its pace of change. Finally, the cross-country relationship between levels of schooling
attained and recent markers of the fertility transition are explored. The paper concludes
with some final thoughts on Caldwell’s hypothesis in light of recent African experience.
PAST THEORY AND EVIDENCE
Almost two decades have passed since the publication of Caldwell’s (1980) ar-
ticle on “Mass education as a determinant of the timing of fertility decline.” The links he
hypothesized between mass schooling and fertility were based largely on the historical
experience of the West. At that time, he faulted much of the literature on education and
fertility in developing countries for having neglected the more immediate impact of
children’s schooling on the reproductive decisionmaking of parents, and for having con-
centrated instead on the impact of parents’ own education on their subsequent fertility.
Even though the period since his article was written has encompassed the start of many
fertility declines throughout the world, his same criticism could be leveled at the litera-
ture even more aptly today. In a review of the state of knowledge on education and fertility
by the Committee on Population of the National Academy of Sciences (Bledsoe et al. 1999),
not a single article addresses this question. Before reviewing what is known about the rela-
tionship between education and fertility in Africa, Caldwell’s hypothesis is revisited here,
setting it in the context of other relevant literature on the demographic transition.
CALDWELL’S HYPOTHESIS REVISITED
Caldwell (1980) listed five mechanisms through which the arrival of mass school-
ing affects the family economy: (1) by reducing the time that children are able and/or
willing to work on behalf of the family either inside or outside the home; (2) by raising
the direct costs of children, not only because of the many costs directly or indirectly
associated with school attendance but also because of the additional demands on re-
sources placed on parents by children who have gained a new authority in the home; (3)
by creating social norms about childhood as a phase of dependency; (4) by speeding up
cultural change and creating new cultures; and (5) in the case of the less developed
countries, by propagating Western middle-class values. Caldwell cited Coale (1969),
who defined mass schooling as the point at which 90 percent of children of primary-
7school age attend school, and he emphasized that the “most potent force for change is
the breadth of education (the proportion of the community receiving some schooling)
rather than the depth (the average duration of schooling among those who have attended
school)” (Caldwell 1980: 249).
Although mechanisms 1 and 2 are directly related to the economic changes that
would ensue in a particular family if a child in that family were to attend school, mecha-
nisms 3, 4, and 5 appear potentially broader in their implications. Indeed, farther on in
his article, Caldwell posits that, at the point where mass schooling has its effects in
launching fertility decline, those effects are or will be universal, affecting all parents,
regardless of their educational level, simultaneously. Thus, although he saw the effects
of mass schooling on parental reproductive behavior as working primarily through the
cumulative changes in the economics of many individual families, apparently he also
saw that externalities could arise from mass schooling in such a way that even those
parents whose children were not yet in school would change their reproductive behav-
ior. Indeed, for clarity we might respecify mechanisms 1 and 2 as pertaining directly to
changes in the family economy and mechanisms 3, 4, and 5 as pertaining to some of the
social externalities of schooling.
Caldwell’s hypothesis was based on a review of the experience of industrialized
countries with the onset of fertility decline and the timing of the arrival of mass school-
ing. He observed that the availability of schools and the adoption of compulsory school-
ing laws were clearly not sufficient by themselves. Rather, he identified the systematic
enforcement of compulsory schooling laws as critical. Although recognizing that the
beginning of the fertility decline in France dates prior to the enforcement of compulsory
schooling laws, Caldwell linked the acceleration of the fertility decline in France that
occurred in the late nineteenth century to the achievement of effective compulsory school-
ing that took place during that same period. In discussing the role of the state in the
English fertility transition, Johansson (1991) reiterated this key dimension of schooling.
She identified the enforcement of compulsory schooling along with the raising of school-
leaving ages as the most effective state policy in enforcing “altruistic parenting” (p. 400)
and effecting fertility decline.
Caldwell’s hypothesis, particularly as it relates to mechanisms 1 and 2, which are
directly linked to the economics of the family, is entirely consistent with Becker’s (1991)
8predictions of rapid fertility decline in response to rises in the price of children as par-
ents trade off quality against quantity. Although Becker did not use the enforcement of
compulsory school laws as an example of the rising costs of children in his analysis, it
could have been a particularly good one. With the enforcement of compulsory school
laws, the price of each child rises and, at the same time, parents are no longer free to
discriminate between children according to sex or birth order, at least through the basic
years of schooling. This situation implies a shift in demand away from quantity to qual-
ity, which leads to further increases in the price of children as parents are forced to incur
the additional out-of-pocket expenses of sending their children to school and the oppor-
tunity costs of losing their children’s time for domestic work or in support of family
enterprises. By identifying the ways in which power shifts from the older to the younger
generation as parents reduce their demand for quantity and increase their demand for
quality, Caldwell put sociological flesh on the bare bones of economic theory by illustrating
some of the processes through which the shift from quantity to quality may occur.
Caldwell’s hypothesis, particularly that part concerning mechanisms 3 and 4 as
they relate to the social externalities of schooling, is surprisingly consistent in its impli-
cations with some of Watkins’s (1991) theories about the social forces underlying the
demographic integration of Europe during the years 1870 to 1960. In her book, From
Provinces into Nations: Demographic Integration in Western Europe, 1870–1960, Wat-
kins makes a compelling case for the decline in linguistic diversity, the rise in national
markets, and the expansion of state power and control as key factors in the shift to
greater national demographic homogeneity as fertility decline spread from just a few
pockets within each country to encompass, ultimately, the whole of each European na-
tion. Indeed, Watkins identifies schooling as the most important aspect of nation build-
ing, particularly because of the enforcement of a national language (or languages, in
countries having more than one) as the medium of instruction in schools. She focuses
primarily on the role of the school in bringing diverse parts of the state together through
a common language. The imposition of a common curriculum, often taught by teachers
from different parts of a country, might also be considered an important aspect of nation
building. Watkins also confirms Caldwell’s interpretation of the French data, dating the
decline in other languages and dialects in France to the reforms of Jules Ferry, Minister
9of Public Instruction under the Third Republic, which introduced free and compulsory
primary schooling in French in 1875. Beyond this date, fertility decline accelerated in
France as traditionally nonfrancophone areas of the country joined in the decline that
had emerged earlier in francophone areas. Whereas Watkins emphasizes the role of lin-
guistic homogeneity and market integration in promoting social interaction or diffusion,
which she sees as the main determinant of fertility decline, Caldwell emphasizes the
role of schools in changing norms about childrearing, both through their effects on the
economics of individual families and through their more global effects on the national
culture. These perspectives can be fully reconciled if changing norms about childrearing
are, in fact, being diffused as a result of nearly universal school attendance, greater
linguistic homogeneity, and the growing role of the state in setting a uniform national
curriculum.
The fifth mechanism through which Caldwell hypothesized that mass schooling
might operate in developing countries was through the spread of Western middle-class
values. Given the limits of technology during the time at which he was writing, he prob-
ably saw formal schooling as the primary vehicle through which such values could be
spread. Today, with radio and television nearly universally accessible, new and power-
ful forces of globalization are at work that can both reinforce the effects of mass school-
ing and possibly bypass them. Bongaarts and Watkins’s (1996) analysis of the pace of
change in contemporary fertility transitions, primarily in Asia and Latin America, sug-
gests that once fertility decline begins in a few countries within a region, it spreads to
others, even to those where socioeconomic conditions are less favorable, suggesting a
process of cross-border diffusion.
In his predictions for the developing world, Caldwell (1980) added a few caveats.
First, he conjectured that demographic change would be unlikely if the achievement of
mass schooling is confined largely to boys. Second, he played it safe by adding that,
although the first generation of mass schooling should be sufficient to trigger the onset
of fertility decline, if it does not, the second generation of mass schooling should guar-
antee it. He mentioned nothing about the role of schools in developing a common na-
tional language, however, a key issue that Watkins identifies in the historical record.
The issue of a common language is of particular concern in Africa, where linguists
10
identify more than 1,250 languages currently in use, only nine of which are spoken as a
first or second language by as many as ten million people each (World Bank 1988).
Since Caldwell first elaborated his mass-schooling hypothesis, much change has
occurred in the African subcontinent. A few countries are clearly in the process of a
rapid fertility transition, and there are hints that the process has begun in a handful of
other countries (Cohen 1998; Kirk and Pillet 1998). Formal schooling has been a pres-
ence on the subcontinent since colonial times and has exhibited rapid spread in the years
since independence in response to rising national aspirations as well as to donor pres-
sures. In light of the historical experience of the West, however, the assumption that
mass schooling can be achieved in Africa in the absence of the enforcement of wide-
spread compulsory schooling laws may appear unreasonable. Ninety percent school
participation in a setting where every child attends school for some required number of
years would differ greatly from 90 percent school participation in an environment where,
for the majority, that rate reflects nothing more than a few years of sporadic attendance.
Furthermore, economic decline and the resulting structural adjustment policies have
slowed or reversed some earlier gains. In what follows, we briefly review recent re-
search findings that may shed some light on the schooling–fertility relationship in sub-
Saharan Africa.
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
In our review of the empirical evidence, only three studies were found that ex-
plore statistically the direct effects of children’s schooling at the community level on
fertility or contraceptive use and only one that is specifically focused on Africa.3  Cast-
erline (1985) used rural data from the 1980 World Fertility Survey (WFS) for Egypt to
test whether children’s access to schools at the village level as well as the primary atten-
dance ratio for girls and boys might affect parents’ educational aspirations for their chil-
dren and their contraceptive use. He found that the desired number of years of school for
boys was negatively affected by distance to secondary school and that the desired num-
ber of years of school for girls was negatively affected by distance to primary school and
positively affected by primary enrollment in the village. He found, too, that current
contraceptive use was affected positively by the village primary-school enrollment rate
11
for girls but negatively by the primary-school enrollment rate for boys. More recently,
Guilkey and Jayne (1997), analyzing data from the 1989 Zimbabwe DHS survey, show
that the number of educational opportunities in the community (the measurement of
which was not defined) had a positive and statistically significant effect on contracep-
tive use. Most recently, Axinn and Barber (1999), using rich contemporary and retro-
spective data on 171 communities in Nepal, find that living near a school significantly
increases a woman’s chance of adopting a permanent contraceptive, even controlling for
the proximity of a school during a woman’s childhood—a variable with its own inde-
pendent effect on contraceptive use.
Studies of the cross-sectional statistical relationships between women’s school-
ing and fertility abound, however. A few recent studies lend some empirical support to
the notion that the community context, in terms of levels of schooling, can contribute to
strengthening the relationship between parents’ schooling and their fertility. Van de Walle
and Foster (1990: 16) pose the question of whether “Africa is on schedule” in terms of
fertility decline. Using an international cross-section of developing countries, they find
that the higher the female primary-school enrollment ratio in 1965, the more rapidly
fertility declined in the subsequent two decades. The effect was much weaker for Africa,
however. A recent update of Jejeebhoy’s (1995) extensive comparative analysis of re-
sults from WFS and DHS data by Diamond et al. (1999) attempts to explain variations
across countries in the effects on fertility of just a few years of schooling. In some
settings, women with a few years of schooling seem to have higher fertility than those
with none, whereas in other settings, the opposite is true. They found that in countries
with higher income per capita and higher levels of female literacy, a few years of schooling
had a depressing effect on fertility. With an exclusive focus on sub-Saharan African
results, Ainsworth et al. (1996) also find that those countries in which the women sampled
had the highest mean number of years of schooling displayed the strongest negative
statistical relationships between number of years of education and cumulative fertility.
Many recent country case studies also call attention to the importance of parents’
education (often female education), in particular, of shifts in its distribution over time,
for explaining fertility patterns and trends. Shapiro (1996: 90) points to increases in the
educational attainment of the female population in Kinshasa, Congo (formerly Zaire) as
12
the “single most important factor” contributing to fertility decline. Dow et al. (1994)
identifies the rising educational aspirations of increasingly educated rural fathers in Kenya,
along with rising educational costs, as a major factor in the reduction of family size
desires. Thomas and Maluccio (1996: 216) speak of the “powerful impact” of education
on contraceptive use and fertility in Zimbabwe, especially, in the case of fertility, among
younger and urban women. Thomas (1998) found similar results in South Africa.
Rutenberg and Diamond (1993) attribute roughly only a third of the decline of nearly
one birth per woman in Botswana in the 1980s to the shifting composition of the popu-
lation by age, education, and residence. Nonetheless, they note that the government
responded to a major drought in rural areas in the early 1980s with supplementary feed-
ing programs in the schools, a factor that may have boosted children’s enrollment and
led to changes in the costs of childrearing, a potential explanation for the part of the
fertility decline not explored further in their study. Furthermore, Rutenberg and Dia-
mond do not mention that public-sector primary-school fees were abolished in 1980,
despite difficult economic conditions (Working Group on Factors Affecting Contracep-
tive Use 1993). Pison et al. (1995), using time-series and cross-district (departments)
analysis for Senegal, point to rising female education as a factor in delays in the age of
marriage and in the decline in fertility rates among those women younger than 30 be-
tween the late 1970s and the early 1990s. Strikingly, none of these authors mentioned
the more contemporary effects of mass schooling on fertility.
In recent literature on African fertility transitions, Kenya has received special
attention. Researchers have been more likely to identify mass schooling in Kenya than
elsewhere as a causal factor in the acceleration of fertility decline. Kelley and Nobbe
(1990) point, in particular, to the rising costs of schooling as a key factor in the Kenyan
transition. The effects of rising costs should be particularly powerful in a context where
most children already attend school and where educational aspirations are high. Robinson
(1992: 456) notes the tremendous commitment of the Kenyan government to education,
the enormous investment in infrastructure, particularly in secondary schools, as well as
the system of fee-based cost sharing as factors with “direct relevance to the fertility
control program.” Brass and Jolley (1993) mention as key factors explaining the fertility
decline that mass literacy has been achieved for those younger than 40; that parents
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share costs of education with the government by helping to build and maintain schools,
in addition to buying books and supplies; and that primary-school attendance has been
mandatory since 1978. None of these three in-depth treatments of the Kenyan transition
substantiates these assertions empirically, however.
The Working Group on Factors Affecting Contraceptive Use (1993), part of a
recent National Academy of Science’s (NAS) panel on Africa, speculates on the pros-
pects for a quantity–quality tradeoff leading to a fertility decline in the context of dra-
matic shifts in financing of education since the mid-1980s. In many countries, parental
costs of children’s schooling have risen substantially as governments have required them
to pay a greater portion of the costs of education, but, at the same time, school quality
has been deteriorating. These changes followed an impressive period of growth from
1960–80, two decades during which new African governments outperformed most other
regions in growth in educational expenditure and enrollment (Schultz 1987).4  The Work-
ing Group’s predictions are carefully qualified. They regard the prospects for a quan-
tity–quality transition in the region as “decidedly mixed” (p. 76). The Group feels it
unlikely that “African parents will continue to make sacrifices to invest in human capi-
tal if the payoff to that investment is in doubt” (p. 77). In a context of rising prices and
declining job prospects, decisions about education hinge on parental assessments of the
value of schooling for their children in relation to its costs. While the Working Group
notes evidence from focus-group discussions in Niger and Nigeria that parents are in-
creasingly aware of the rising costs of rearing children and that they mention such costs
as a principal disadvantage of having large families, the Group also points out that en-
rollments have been declining in some countries in response to these changes. They
conclude that “the more responsive the demand is for education with respect to price,
the less likely are the prospects for a quantity–quality tradeoff” (p. 81).
All of these studies are disadvantaged by the nature of their data. A theory about
the onset of fertility decline cannot be tested by looking at cross-sectional correlations at
a single point in time or at the experience of any one country over time. Comparisons
across countries over time are required. Educational policy that affects the accessibility,
price, and quality of schooling as well as the degree of enforcement of compulsory
schooling operates at the level of the state. Indeed, if educational systems at the state
14
level are most salient in their implications for demographic change, then none of the
evidence reviewed up to this point can be used to prove or disprove the demographic
importance of mass schooling (see Amin and Lloyd [1998] for an analogous point about
gender systems). As Mason (1997) points out, the impact of changes in opportunity
structures at the level of the state (she uses the example of women’s opportunities or
gender systems) can only be played out through the observation of successive cohorts.
Furthermore, the experiences of one country must be set against the experiences of oth-
ers in order to observe commonalties and differences. Before we turn to the trends in
education since independence, some background on the colonial legacy as it has af-
fected the education sector and a comparison of the evolution of state educational poli-
cies since independence are useful.
THE EVOLUTION OF FORMAL SCHOOLING IN AFRICA
Current educational systems in sub-Saharan Africa have been forged from inher-
ited colonial structures and an array of postindependence strategies to expand and im-
prove educational opportunities. Although colonial approaches to education varied con-
siderably across the region, they all offered schooling only to a small minority of the
African population. Governments of the new states of Africa were faced with the monu-
mental task of putting into place a comprehensive systems of schools, teachers, and
books where none existed. The diverse approaches to this task were closely tied to colo-
nial experience.
Colonial Educational Systems
Educational systems in colonial Africa mirrored those of the metropole (typi-
cally, the colonial power’s capital city), and, by the end of the colonial period, most
operated dual systems, one for (white) colonials and another for Africans. The children
of colonial Europeans typically began their education locally with a curriculum that was
often wholly imported from abroad. They completed tertiary, and sometimes even sec-
ondary school in Europe. In contrast, the authority and administration of education for
Africans proceeded along lines consistent with the aims of the particular colonial pres-
ence. The French administration’s policy toward Africans was one of assimilation; Afri-
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cans, through proper training, could be inducted into the French way of life. The French
held no pretense of offering this training universally, opting instead for “civilizing” a
select few Africans with the ultimate goal of granting them French citizenship. The
Portuguese also professed a policy of assimilation for Africans under their jurisdiction,
but in practice the implementation of their approach was one of remote association.
Plagued with political and economic difficulties in the colonies and in Portugal, the
education of Africans was generally ignored in Portuguese territories (Duffy 1961 and
1970). The Belgian colonial presence was one of the harshest; Belgians overtly sought
to maintain their supremacy and denied virtually all Africans any form of meaningful
educational or economic advancement. The mass of Africans were to be used, for their
own good and the good of the crown, as inexpensive labor (Scanlon 1964). Finally, the
British colonial approach to the “Native question” was one of segregation and paternal-
ism.5  The British never accepted that Africans could become equal, or that they would
be suitable for the responsibilities and privileges of British citizenship. However, Afri-
cans could be trained to fulfill some lower-level clerkship or administrative responsi-
bilities, and a few could be entrusted with the implementation of British policies. The
British conceded that they had a responsibility to “uplift” the African from what they
perceived as a low level of civilization, but any notion of equality to Europeans was
summarily dismissed by most (Dubow 1987). The British and the Belgians viewed Af-
ricans collectively in racial terms, though the British were much more tolerant of local
customs and autonomy than was any other colonial power. The French and Portuguese,
in contrast, emphasized individual qualities of a select few at the cost of neglecting the
majority (Uchendu 1979).
In each of the colonial “Native” policies, the role of missionaries and the degree
of centralized control exerted by the colonial regime largely determined the depth, spread,
and content of African education prior to independence.6  In French West Africa, for
example, all missionary schools were required to adhere to a common French curricu-
lum by the turn of the twentieth century. French colonial education focused on training
Africans to become French: Subjects were taught in French, emphasized French culture,
and ideally, training was equivalent to that in French schools. For the exceptional, edu-
cation continued through the tertiary level at the metropole. Those who received ad-
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vanced training were a select minority, chosen with great care by the colonials. Others
not permitted to matriculate in academically oriented schools were trained in basic hy-
giene, agricultural sciences, and vocational crafts, the skills considered by the French to
be the most useful for the majority, an unpopular policy with parents, who thought edu-
cation should allow for social and economic advancement (Yansané 1985). The Portu-
guese maintained a similar doctrine, although without an enforced centralization of policy.
Instruction promoted African assimilation, but little was done to provide widespread
education. As with the French, the Portuguese offered academic training to a select few
in urban areas. Only a small portion of other children had the chance to attend basic
primary schools offering a second-tier curriculum, one nonetheless designed to promote
Portuguese language and civilization. The government operated few schools outside
urban areas and relied upon missionaries to teach the “uncivilized” sector of the African
population as they saw fit (Duffy 1961).
The British colonial system of education contrasts sharply with the French. Mis-
sionary schools were the vehicle of education in the British colonies; the colonial gov-
ernment had few schools of their own. The colonial government provided educational
subsidies to voluntary organizations, but did little to centralize practices or impose uni-
versal standards (Cameron 1970). Although the autonomy accorded missionaries al-
lowed for flexibility and accommodation to local environments, it also led to a great
deal of experimentation and wide variation in curricular content. Depending on the
school’s religious denomination and order, subjects of instruction ranged from moral
values or biblical studies to liberal arts to vocational crafts. Also, in direct contrast to the
French and congruent with the British philosophy of upliftment, the British encouraged
some minimal level of education for all Africans (Cameron 1970). The intent was to
provide basic education to Africans to make them productive members of the colony,
and to provide extra training for the few who would then take on low-level administra-
tive positions (Uchendu 1979).
The Belgian system of education was systematic and explicit. Missionary schools
functioned as authorized government schools until 1953, and thereafter continued to
work in an official capacity. Education was utilitarian and centralized, designed to pro-
vide a minimal level of schooling to all Africans to make them useful as cheap labor for
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industry. Few opportunities existed for Africans to attain a secondary education, and
virtually none for education beyond that level. Furthermore, the missionaries of the
Belgian Congo were more homogenous than were those in the British colonies or even
in the French territories. Missionaries were predominantly Roman Catholic, and most
were from rural, conservative orders in Belgium that did not stress intellectual develop-
ment (Yates 1982). Unlike the French and British systems, which provided higher train-
ing for an elite group, the Belgian colonial system saw no use in providing Africans with
anything more than a basic education (Scanlon 1964).
The various forms of colonial education for “Natives” was tightly bound to the
ideology of each colonial power, informed by the structure of rule imposed by Europe-
ans, and ultimately designed to serve the purposes of the colonials who lived there.
Language policies for entry-level primary school are a good example of this point. In
the former British colonies, 13 out of 15 use one or more African language as the me-
dium of instruction, whereas in 11 out of 15 former French colonies, French is used as
the medium of instruction; this sort of policy applies to all three of the former Portu-
guese colonies as well (World Bank 1988). No country in colonial Africa provided uni-
versal schooling; however, those colonies that had strong settler economies, primarily
in eastern and southern Africa, provided schooling to more native children than did
colonies in other areas. Europeans living in settler colonies simply required greater num-
bers of educated employees. In those colonies with predominately extractive economies
(agriculture or mining), educated workers were not critical to successful operations, and
therefore, schooling was not a priority.
Postindependence Trends in Education
At independence, each new African state had the daunting task of transforming
dual and largely segregated educational structures into one unified system to which
access was possible—if not fully realized in the short run—for all citizens.7  Another,
and no less important task, was to establish a uniform national curriculum that was
consistent with the development and social objectives of the independent state (Marah
1989). The issue of which language or languages to choose as a medium of instruction
was a further challenge. The pedagogical advantages of early learning in the mother
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tongue had to be weighed against the need to create literacy in a common national lan-
guage in the context of a continent that was and remains largely fractionalized along
ethnolinguistic lines.8  Education was seen as a means both for rapid economic develop-
ment and for the dissemination of a unified set of national civic values.9  The achieve-
ment of these goals required a dismantling of the de jure and de facto barriers to educa-
tion, while also generating the levels of investment and financing necessary to support
the expansion of the education sector.
The challenge was to accomplish these tasks while using limited resources effi-
ciently. In most cases, the dramatic growth of investment in education in the early
postindependence period brought virtually no concomitant attempt to redefine the basic
assumptions of the educational system or to alter drastically the framework of the provi-
sion of education inherited from the former colonial regimes.10  Instead, the African
states co-opted existing systems and modified only those aspects that were clearly in-
congruent with their objectives. The educational system of the newly independent state
thus represented an extension, rather than a replacement, of existing modalities.
In the former French colonial states where educational systems had focused pri-
marily on the assimilation of a limited number of African elites through schooling con-
trolled by the metropole, an already centralized system was transferred to African con-
trol. The educational system was expanded to the general population and loyalty to
France was replaced by nationalism. Nonetheless, for most countries, close relations
with France continued, and a strong French influence remained in the structure and
content of education.
In the former British colonial states, which had provided basic education to more
Africans than had the French system, the newly independent states took on the ambi-
tious task of centralizing, integrating, and standardizing the diverse field of educational
provision, creating a system that would focus on national rather than local or particular
interests and goals. A few countries pursued a socialist approach, including Tanzania
and Zimbabwe. In these countries, the curriculum was adapted to teach socialist values
and doctrines. Although different in style from other countries, those advocating a so-
cialist approach focused on many of the same goals as did the others, including expand-
ing access to education to all citizens, granting them equality of opportunity, and recog-
nizing the importance of education for national development.
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Regardless of postindependence approaches to development, the importance ac-
corded to education in national development plans led to a dramatic increase in educa-
tional expenditure and a tremendous expansion of the educational infrastructure. These
investments were facilitated by strong economic growth rates in the late 1960s and 1970s
(Kinyanjui 1993; World Bank 1988). For instance, total public expenditure on education
in constant US dollars grew by roughly 7 percent a year between 1970 and 1980 on
average across sub-Saharan Africa, with similar average rates of growth in the former
British and French colonies, well above the rates required to keep pace with the growth
in school-age populations (Donors to African Education 1994). Indeed, growth of edu-
cational expenditure exceeded growth in gross national product (GNP) over the decade
of the 1970s, resulting in a rising percentage of GNP devoted to educational expendi-
ture. By 1980, the average proportion of GNP devoted to educational expenditure had
grown from 3.2 to 4.2 percent, with similar growth in former British and former French
colonies (see Table 2). Particular countries, including Botswana, Côte d’Ivoire, and Kenya,
allocated sizably greater proportions of their GNPs to educational expenditure than av-
erage during this period (Donors to African Education 1994).11  Despite average de-
clines in the percentage of the overall education budget allocated to primary schooling
during the 1970s, all regions showed small increases in per-pupil expenditures at the
primary level, suggesting slight improvements in educational quality.12
The economic and political conditions in the 1980s, however, sharply curtailed
and often ended the impressive educational gains of the prior two decades. African coun-
tries were particularly hard hit by increased world prices for oil, decreased export prices,
and higher external debt (Hodd 1989; World Bank 1988). Additionally, most countries
underwent structural adjustment programs that resulted in cutbacks in social-sector spend-
ing, including educational expenditures (Reimers 1994).13  This retraction of national
investment in education is reflected in declines in the growth rate of educational expen-
ditures in constant dollars from 6.2 on average from 1970–80 to 2.1 from 1980–90 (Do-
nors to African Education 1994). The decline in average growth rates in educational
expenditure was even more dramatic in the former French colonies (6.7 percent per
annum to 0.5 percent per annum) than in the former British colonies (6.5 percent per
annum to 2.2 per annum). These trends are reflected in the percentage of GNP devoted
to educational expenditure; in the former French colonies, the average declined from 4.3
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percent in 1980 to 3.6 percent in 1990, whereas in the former British colonies the aver-
age percentage rose slightly from 4.5 percent to 4.8 percent (as shown in Table 2). While
per-pupil expenditures on primary schooling were maintained at roughly their 1980 level
in the former British colonies, per-pupil expenditures declined on average in the former
French colonies, suggesting a decline in resources per student.
In addition to economic decline in the region, for many other countries in Africa
during the 1970s and 1980 (for example, Angola, Ethiopia, Liberia, Mozambique, Nige-
ria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Sudan), political instability and internal conflict resulted
Table 2 Trends in educational investment indicators for sub-Saharan Africa, by former
colonial status
Former British Former French
Expenditure colonies (N) colonies (N) All countries (N)
Total public expenditure on
education as percentage of GNP
1970 3.7 (15) 3.3 (13) 3.2 (34)
1980 4.5 (15) 4.3 (13) 4.2 (36)
1990 4.8 (13) 3.6 (15) 4.1 (36)
Percent of recurrent public
expenditures on education
allocated to primary schooling
1970 47  (13) 51 (10) 49 (26)
1980 44  (15) 43 (14) 44 (33)
1990 37  (12) 45 (13) 45 (32)
Current public expenditure
for primary-school student
(constant 1990 US$)
1970 49  (10) 102  (9) 71 (22)
1980 58  (14) 109 (12) 74 (31)
1990 60  (12) 96  (11) 76 (29)
Note: The following small island states are not included in the averages: Comoros, Cape Verde, Mau-
ritius, São Tomé and Principe, and Seychelles.  South Africa is also excluded because data are not
strictly comparable.
Source:  Donors to African Education (1994).
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in a marked decline in education and in its infrastructure, including a reduction in the
depth and breadth of educational development (Kinyanjui 1993). For example, nine
years after the Amin coup in 1971, Uganda had the lowest per-pupil spending levels
among all the countries, and this pattern continued until 1990 (Donors to African Educa-
tion 1994). In Nigeria, political instability led to a continuous decline in educational
expenditures of 15.7 percent per year during the 1980s (Donors to African Education
1994). The impact of instability and conflict on education is no less relevant in the
1990s for countries such as Burundi, Congo, and Rwanda.
In the 1990s, qualitative evaluations of the educational situation in the region
describe a thinning of the provision of schooling and the inability of countries to main-
tain even current levels of educational achievement, given lagging growth in investment
and accelerating growth in the size of school-age cohorts (Kinyanjui 1993; Nieuwenhuis
1996). Table 3 presents three indicators of the level and focus of investment in education
for the early 1990s for the subset of sub-Saharan countries selected for this analysis.
They include the total public expenditure for education as a percentage of GNP, current
expenditures per primary-school student, and the percentage of recurrent public expen-
diture for the primary-school level.
A tremendous range is found across Africa in 1990 in the share of national GNP
devoted to public education, an indicator that can be used to rank countries according to
their overall level of commitment to educational investment. Although poor countries
spend less overall on education, lower incomes per se should not be presumed to be a
factor in reducing the proportion of that income allocated to education. The countries
committing more than 5 percent of GNP to education, an impressive commitment, in-
clude Botswana, Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania,
and Zimbabwe. How this level of financial commitment translates into opportunities for
basic education at the primary level depends on the underlying level of development of
the country as reflected in its GNP, the proportion of the total education budget devoted
to schooling at the primary level, the number of students enrolled in primary school, and
teachers’ salaries (the major component of recurrent educational expenditures in the
primary sector). Countries that allocate more than 50 percent of their overall education
budget to primary schooling include Angola, Cameroon, Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, and
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Zimbabwe.14  Unfortunately, measures of expenditure per primary-school student can be
deceptive, because if teachers’ salaries are relatively high and enrollments are relatively
low, a less inefficient system can appear to be doing better than a system that is more
efficient and is serving more students. Countries with high per-pupil expenditures in-
clude those that are known to be doing well on other measures (that is, on the percentage
Table 3  Recent national expenditure on education among selected sub-Saharan coun-
tries, 1990
Public current
Total public Percentage of public expenditure
Colonial expenditure for recurrent expenditure per primary-
history education as for education allocated school student
and country percentage of GNP to primary schooling (constant 1990 US$)
British
Botswana 8.4 31 219
Ghana 3.3 29 21
Kenya 6.8 57 46
Malawi 3.4 42 17
Nigeria 1.7 17a 18a
Tanzania 5.8 42 12
Uganda 2.9 20 5
Zambia 2.9 32 16
Zimbabwe 11.4 54 126
French
Burkina Faso 2.3 42 61
Cameroon 3.4 70 90
Côte d’Ivoire 6.3 40 b 193b
Madagascar 1.5 50 17
Mali 3.2 46 107
Senegal 3.7 39 116
Other
Angola na 96 261
Congo (former Zaire) 0.9 55 9
Ethiopia 4.9 54 51
Mozambique 6.3 50 20
Namibia 8.0 21 na
South Africa 5.5 72c 1,782
na=Not available. a1980. b1985.  cIncludes general secondary school.
Source:  Donors to African Education (1994).
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of GNP devoted to educational expenditures and on the percentage of educational ex-
penditures devoted to primary schooling) such as Botswana, Cameroon, South Africa,
and Zimbabwe, and others that are not, such as the former French colonies of Mali and
Senegal, where relative salaries for teachers are known to be high.
THE QUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL DATA
Most of what we know about trends in primary schooling in developing countries
comes from annual statistics produced by UNESCO on gross primary-school enroll-
ment ratios. Censuses, which always include questions on the educational participation
and attainment of the population, are only conducted every ten years, and the published
results are often delayed, given limited circulation, and produced in a form that is rarely
comparable with other censuses. Although they constitute another source of data on
educational participation for particular countries, national household surveys have never
been compiled in such a way that they can be used comparatively as an alternative
source of data on education. Only in the last few years has the Demographic and Health
Survey (DHS) program, which has been collecting information systematically on edu-
cational participation and attainment of household members in all surveys since 1990,
begun to allow researchers an alternative perspective on educational levels and trends in
a substantial number of developing countries (Gardner 1998; Filmer and Pritchett 1999).
To construct enrollment ratios, UNESCO uses United Nations population esti-
mates of the size of the primary-school population combined with official reports from
education ministries of numbers enrolled in primary school. Thus, the gross primary-
school enrollment ratio is calculated as the number of children of any age enrolled at the
primary-school level divided by the number of children of the appropriate age to attend
that level.15  This calculation provides a crude indicator of participation rates in primary
school. Because of late ages of entry as well as grade repetition, however, these levels
and trends are sometimes hard to interpret. Ages in the numerator of the ratio are not
consistent with ages in the denominator, and therefore ratios greater than 100 are pos-
sible. Furthermore, a decline in the ratio could reflect a decline in enrollment or, alterna-
tively, could imply improvements in the efficiency of the system through reductions in
repetition rates or a shift toward more appropriate ages at entry. Similarly, a rise in the
ratio could imply a rise in enrollment rates or, alternatively, a deterioration in the effi-
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ciency of the system due to rising repetition rates or delayed ages of entry. More typi-
cally, trends probably reflect simultaneous changes in a variety of underlying factors,
some of which may be more favorable and some less. Given scarce resources, schools
and district education offices have every incentive to provide inflated numbers to the
central authorities in order to secure necessary funding. In addition, some evidence sug-
gests that enrollment as reported by school systems reflects opening-day numbers rather
than enrollments in mid-year or year-end, which would reflect experience more accu-
rately (Behrman and Rosenzweig 1994).
Probably for all of the reasons enumerated, recent compilations of social indica-
tors have sought alternatives to gross primary- or secondary-school enrollment ratios
when constructing measures of educational and social progress. For example, the Hu-
man Development Index (HDI) constructed by the United Nations Development Pro-
gram (UNDP 1997) relies mainly on literacy rates for the adult population for identify-
ing one of three components of the index designed to capture the educational attainment
of the population.16  In order to avoid combining population-based data with incompat-
ible school-based data, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), in its annual
assessment of The Progress of Nations, now uses a measure of the proportion of chil-
dren completing four years of school, which is derived from year-by-year school-enroll-
ment data provided by education ministries (UNICEF 1993). These percentages, al-
though free of the biases inherent in relating school-based data to population-based data,
are still subject to the whims of education ministries where the politics of education
finance may lead to unpredictable distortions.
Using a gross enrollment ratio of 90 as a measure of mass schooling, UNESCO
data imply that 13 African countries had achieved mass schooling by 1980. Two more
countries would appear to have joined the group in 1985, but by the mid-1990s the
number of countries with mass schooling as defined by the gross enrollment ratio had
fallen to eight. These are Botswana, Kenya, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, Togo, Zam-
bia, and Zimbabwe, all of which have calculated enrollment ratios consistently above 90
since 1980 at least. Countries that had dropped off the list include Angola, Cameroon,
Congo, Madagascar, Mozambique, Nigeria, and Tanzania. Although we know that many
countries suffered setbacks in the educational sector in the 1980s and early 1990s as a
result of economic reversals (the cases of Nigeria and Tanzania are particularly no-
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table), it is implausible that many of the countries on the list in 1980 had ever attained
near-universal primary enrollment. Comparisons of current school-attendance rates from
recent DHS surveys for children aged 10–11 with UNESCO’s gross enrollment ratios17
show that population-based participation rates are almost always lower than the levels
of primary-school participation implied by gross enrollment ratios and often lower by a
substantial margin (as  Table 4 demonstrates). Such comparisons provide further confirma-
tion of the problematic nature of enrollment ratios as a measure of educational participation.
Table 4 Percentage of children aged 10–11 enrolled in school and gross primary en-
rollment ratios for 16 sub-Saharan countries, by country and year, Demographic and
Health Surveys and UNESCO
Gross primary
Currently enrolled enrollment ratio
Country Year (DHS) (UNESCO)
Burkina Faso 1993 32 39
Cameroon 1991 76 96
Côte d’Ivoire 1994 55 68
Ghana 1993 82 76a
Kenya 1993 90 91
Madagascar 1992 69 76
Malawi 1992 67 80
Mali 1995–96 30 32b
Namibia 1992 89 136
Nigeria 1990 65 85
Senegal 1992–93 40 59
South Africa 1993 97 115
Tanzania 1991–92 66 70
Uganda 1995 80 67c
Zambia 1992 83 87
Zimbabwe 1994 93 115c
Note:  Botswana is omitted from the table because DHS data on education are available only
for females aged 15–49.
a1991. b1994. c1993.
Sources:  UNESCO (1997) and  Gardner (1998).  For South Africa, South African Labour
and Development Unit (1993).
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The ideal source of educational participation data for pan-African comparisons
would be recent population censuses, because they are designed to cover the whole
population and because both current enrollment rates and past attainment rates as far
back as independence can be derived from these data. Unfortunately, results of recent
censuses are not easily available in published form, much less in computer-readable
form and, therefore, cannot be used to provide a full picture of levels and trends in
educational participation since independence in Africa. Those that are available, how-
ever, can be used for comparison to assess the quality of the data from the DHS, which
are based on relatively small samples of the census population. Censuses are imperfect
and frequently miss certain portions of the population that are difficult to reach and that
are, therefore, likely to have less access to educational resources than others, whether
for political, economic, or geographic reasons. Because surveys are usually drawn from
sampling frames developed for the census, they may also have similar biases. In the
sample of ten countries considered here for which comparisons are possible, we would
expect that samples drawn from the census would be as likely to underestimate as to
overestimate proportions enrolled in school. A systematic bias in one direction or an-
other would raise additional questions about survey estimates.
Figures 1a–1c present recent census data on trends in the proportion of the popu-
lation of ten countries by age that never enrolled in school. The data shown are for
Cameroon (1987), Ghana (1984), Kenya (1989), Malawi (1987), Mali (1987), Namibia
(1991), Uganda (1991), Tanzania (1988), Zambia (1990), and Zimbabwe (1992).18  For
each of these countries, percentages that never enrolled are also calculated by age from
DHS data on a comparable basis by adjusting the ages to reflect the number of years that
elapsed between the most recent census and the DHS survey.19  Figure 1a shows results
for the three countries for which data are largely consistent; Figure 1b shows results for
the four countries for which differences emerge for some age groups; and Figure 1c
shows results for the three countries for which data appear inconsistent over a broader
range of ages. Although the consistency of the DHS and census estimates of levels and
trends in school participation for Namibia, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe is reassuring (see
Figure 1a), the estimates for the other seven countries are disconcerting. The census
estimates always imply a slightly less educated population than that implied by the DHS
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data. These differences are relatively small in the cases of Cameroon, Ghana, and Uganda
(see Figure 1b) where only some age groups are affected, but the effects are larger for
women than for men (not shown) and differences as great as 6–10 percentage points
emerge in the peak reproductive years in Ghana (25–39) and of 6–8 percentage points
among 35–44-year-old women in Uganda. In Kenya, the differences are more consistent
across the age spectrum, with differences ranging from 3–9 percentage points. The big-
gest differences emerge for Mali, Malawi, and Zambia (see Figure 1c). Of these three
countries, the differences are greatest for Zambia, where the gaps range from 12–15
percentage points. Although both sources of data imply similar trends in the proportion
ever attending school, the census suggests a less educated population than that implied
by the DHS.
The percentage with no schooling reflects only one extreme of the educational
distribution. In most of these countries, significant progress has been made over the
years since independence in enrolling children in school. A more telling comparison
between the data from these two sources would be the proportion completing primary
school. Unfortunately, censuses did not adopt consistent approaches to the measure-
ment of educational levels despite the effort of the UN to recommend certain uniform
guidelines.20  Some census questionnaires ask about grades completed and some ask
about years of education attained. Furthermore, census reports do not always make clear
which approach was used. Here, a comparison of primary-school completion rates from the
census and the DHS data is possible for only three of the ten countries presented in Figures
1a–c. These were the only countries for which definitions of education attained were unam-
biguous and for which published tables could be replicated using the DHS data. Figure
2 presents trends in primary completion rates for Kenya, Zambia, and Zimbabwe (in the
cases of Kenya and Zambia, which have eight years of primary schooling, the comple-
tion of five or more years was used). In all three cases, the census data imply a less
educated population than do the DHS data, with the gap widest at the youngest ages.21
The stated goal of this paper is to test Caldwell’s mass-schooling hypothesis for
Africa, linking the arrival of mass schooling with declines in fertility. These census/
DHS comparisons raise questions about whether we can know with confidence, using
DHS data alone, which countries have achieved mass schooling and, if so, when that
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might have occurred. Moreover, timing the fertility transition requires accurate mea-
sures of fertility. In light of the close link between educational distributions and esti-
mated fertility rates, current levels of fertility for some countries, as derived from DHS
surveys, could be at least slightly underestimated and, for other countries, estimated
recent fertility trends could be slightly exaggerated. Census data, of course, are not a
gold standard for data comparisons; indeed, censuses are often notorious for under-
representing certain groups whether because of socioeconomic disadvantage, geo-
graphic isolation, or political disenfranchisement. DHS samples, however, use census
data for sampling frames, which would suggest that biases in censuses would be closely
mirrored in DHS samples. Although in many cases, DHS and census estimates match
one another closely, in those cases with differences, DHS samples are consistently more
educated. Further speculation on biases for these data sources on sub-Saharan African
education is difficult. Whether education data are derived from the DHS or from cen-
suses, however, any bias in the data probably tends toward an overestimate of educa-
tional attainment.
PATTERNS AND TRENDS OF FORMAL SCHOOLING
Colonial legacies in education, uneven political commitment, and economic fluc-
tuations have shaped trends in schooling across countries in sub-Saharan Africa pro-
foundly. As noted above, most studies tracing trends in education have used UNESCO’s
gross enrollment ratios and thus present an inflated and inaccurate picture. Therefore,
before exploring the association between fertility patterns and the provision of mass
schooling, we first reconsider trends and patterns of education in the region using data
from 17 of the sub-Saharan DHS household surveys, including all the countries that are
known to be leaders in educational investments.22  Using the educational distribution of
the population by age in the most recently available DHS surveys, the educational at-
tainment of 15–19-year-olds is estimated at various points in the past by calculating in
which year each age cohort would have been 15–19 years old. To the extent that system-
atic biases exist in age reporting and to the extent that survival rates differ significantly
by educational attainment, estimates of trends will be biased. Because of differential
survival rates by education, we would expect that older cohorts would appear more
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educated than they actually are, with the bias being greatest for the earliest estimates in
1960 and lessening since then. Typical errors of age rounding are also likely to flatten
trends. These biases are not expected to affect cross-country rankings in schooling lev-
els seriously, however.
Caldwell defined the achievement of mass schooling as the point at which 90
percent of primary-school-aged children attend school. To operationalize attendance at
primary school, a broad definition is used here: The percentage of 15–19-year-olds who
have ever attended school is calculated.23  Figures 3a and 3b show the results for succes-
sive cohorts of 15–19-year-olds, starting in 1960 and continuing through the most re-
cent year for which data are available. Several points are illustrated strikingly in these
graphs. First, and not surprisingly, the 1960 level of attendance across all countries falls
well below levels required for mass schooling and, considering the biases noted above,
these data can be taken as confirmation of the inadequate reach of colonial schooling
systems. Second, countries of West Africa (Figure 3b), comprising former colonies of
both Britain and France, have a notably lower level of attendance for 1960 than those in
southern and eastern Africa (Figure 3a), most of which are former British colonies. Of
the West African countries, the former French colonies of Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire,
and Senegal lag considerably behind the former British colonies (including Cameroon,
which was colonized by both Britain and France). Viewing changes over time, most
countries have made substantial progress in facilitating school attendance for children.
All countries show clear increases in the percentage of children who attend school,
although, consistent with spending trends and state educational strategies, the levels of
attendance achieved by the former French colonies of West Africa are, in general, not as
great as those achieved in the former British colonies. Extremes within each region
exist, reflecting specific agendas and economic conditions. In East Africa, for example,
the poor, land-locked country of Malawi had set the transport of goods and labor, rather
than education, as a priority (Nieuwenhuis 1996), while Kenya saw to it that educational
expenditures, especially for primary schooling, continued to grow. Figure 3a, accord-
ingly, shows that Malawi has experienced about a 25 percentage point increase in atten-
dance between 1960 and 1992, although, with only 75 percent of 15–19-year-olds cur-
rently attending school, the country is far from attaining an ideal of universal schooling.
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Figure 3a   Trends in the percentage of children aged 15–19 who ever attended school,
southern and eastern Africa
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Figure 3b   Trends in the percentage of children aged 15–19 who ever attended school,
West Africa
Sources: DHS figures calculated from DHS country data, standard recode files.
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Kenya, on the other hand, shows close to a 45 percentage point increase for children
attending school, so that by 1993, almost 95 percent of 15–19-year-olds had attended
school at some point in their lives, a level just below that for South Africa. In the West
African countries of Cameroon, Ghana, and Nigeria in 1960, only about 35 percent of
15–19-year-olds had ever attended school, and in Cameron and Ghana, this level climbs
to more than 80 percent for the most recent time period. Although these countries are
still some distance away from achieving Caldwell’s definition of mass schooling, the
data nonetheless represent an impressive 45 percentage point gain in school attendance.
The cases of Ghana and Nigeria are particularly impressive because secondary and ter-
tiary schooling received a disproportionate share of these countries’ education budgets.
In Burkina Faso and Mali in the mid-1990s, by contrast, fewer than 35 percent of 15–
19-year-olds had ever attended school for the last date available. Although this number
still represents a 20 percentage point gain for children who go to school, the proportion
remains abysmally low.
In spite of evident progress, the figures are also striking in showing that so few
countries meet Caldwell’s definition of mass schooling. In only six countries, Bots-
wana, Kenya, Namibia, South Africa, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, have at least 90 percent
of 15–19-year-olds ever attended school. Furthermore, for most of these countries, that
level of schooling had already been achieved some 15 to 20 years ago. Zambia—the
country showing the greatest inconsistencies in estimates of educational participation
between the census and the DHS—appears to have crossed this threshold first, in the
mid-1970s, and seems to have remained more or less at that level since then. This find-
ing is congruent with a colonial policy emphasizing broad access to primary education
(Kelly 1991) and strong economic growth and massive expenditures on education in the
first postindependence decade (Nieuwenhuis 1996). South Africa reached the threshold
in the late 1970s, followed quickly by the other four countries in the early to mid-1980s.
Furthermore, evidence from Madagascar, which shows a decline for the most recent
period, suggests that a trend toward mass schooling is not irreversible.
The point that mass schooling is a rare phenomenon in sub-Saharan Africa is
even more striking if one considers that the trends displayed in Figures 3a and 3b repre-
sent only the point of entry into the educational system. The designation “ever attended
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school” indicates whether children had walked into a classroom; the measure does not
indicate how long they stayed. As noted earlier, Caldwell’s discussion of mass school-
ing was informed by a Western experience where mandatory schooling was enforced.
Few countries in sub-Saharan Africa have the capacity to enforce regular school atten-
dance; many children might begin school but few may complete even a primary-level
education. Two measures are used here to describe the depth of schooling, that is, to
show how long children remained in school. One is the percent of 15–19-year-olds who
have completed a primary education, however that level may be defined in their own
countries. Because of the variation across countries in the duration of primary schooling
(for example, Kenya’s primary schooling consists of eight grades, whereas Madagascar’s
has only five), we also compare the percentage of 15–19-year-olds who have completed
at least four years of schooling—a measure that can be interpreted consistently across
countries.
The trends in completion of at least four years of schooling illustrate the chal-
lenges in ensuring that children who begin school complete even a few grades (see
Figures 4a and 4b). To facilitate a comparison of countries’ achievements in attaining
depth in mass schooling, we chose, somewhat arbitrarily, 75 percent of 15–19-year-olds
who have completed four years of school as a threshold marking mass-schooling progress.
The threshold is well below the 90 percent level of “ever-attended” used by Caldwell,
but nevertheless indicates that some depth of education is pervasive in the population.
Eight of the 17 countries in this comparison have surpassed the 75 percent threshold,
and with the exception of Ghana, they are all southern or eastern countries. Most coun-
tries crossed this threshold in the late 1970s, indicating that some depth of education has
accompanied the wider attendance described above. The progress has been slow, how-
ever. A few countries, including Burkina Faso, Madagascar, Mali, Malawi, and Senegal,
have registered little net change in the past three decades. The trends in general are
consistent with those described for the measure “ever attended,” and they reflect the
ebbs and flows of state finance and the intrasectoral priorities of educational expendi-
ture. The former French colonies of West Africa show only small gains in the percentage
completing at least four years of school, and are at some distance from the 75 percent
mark. The West African countries that are former British colonies, by contrast, show
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Figure 4a   Trends in the percentage of children aged 15–19 who completed four or
more years of schooling, southern and eastern Africa
Mass-schooling level
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*Women aged 15–49.
Sources: DHS figures calculated from DHS country data, standard recode files.
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Figure 4b   Trends in the percentage of children aged 15–19 who completed four or
more years of schooling, West Africa
Sources: DHS figures calculated from DHS country data, standard recode files.
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steeper inclines and are much closer to (or in the case of Ghana, just at) the 75 percent
mark. As mentioned above, most countries of West Africa gave greater priority to sec-
ondary and tertiary education, which probably explains the lag in levels there compared
with southern and eastern countries, which tended to allot proportionately more resources
to primary education. However, while countries of West Africa have continued to show
increasing trends, albeit at relatively low levels, countries of southern and eastern Africa
reached plateaus in the mid 1980s, and further indication of increases there are absent.
Three countries, Madagascar, Namibia, and Zambia, exhibit declines.
The slow and fragile progress in the depth of schooling hinted at in Figures 4a
and 4b is repeated more boldly in the trends describing primary-school completion for
15–19-year-olds (as shown in Figures 5a and 5b). Because young people aged 15–19 at
the time of the survey have not all had a chance to complete primary school as the result
of these late ages of entry, the assessment of trends in primary-school completion does
not extend beyond 1990. Again, to facilitate comparison, we chose a 60 percent level as
a threshold to indicate that more than half of the population has completed primary
school—a modest but notable achievement for most countries in the region. Only Bots-
wana, Ghana, Kenya, South Africa, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe had achieved this level by
1990.24  Similar to patterns for other measures, Zambia was a front runner in surpassing
the 60 percent mark, but since the early 1970s, the level for Zambia has declined below
that threshold. Most other countries in southern and eastern Africa also have shown
recent declines or plateaus that compromise the impressive gains of the late 1970s and
early 1980s (Botswana, South Africa, and Zimbabwe are the exceptions). Other than
Ghana, most West African countries in the sample show evidence of stagnation since the
late 1980s (anecdotal evidence suggests that this is the case for Nigeria as well), a prob-
able manifestation of the sharp decline in the growth rate of educational expenditure in
the region. The slowdown is particularly alarming because many of these countries cur-
rently remain at very low levels of primary-school completion. Burkina Faso, Côte
d’Ivoire, Mali, and Senegal show levels of completed primary school below 35 percent,
levels not much higher than those of three decades past. The low levels in West Africa
are even more remarkable because these countries devote fewer years to the primary-
school curriculum than do countries in other parts of sub-Saharan Africa. All West Afri-
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Figure 5a   Trends in the percentage of children aged 15–19 who completed primary
school, southern and eastern Africa
Mass-schooling level
*Women aged 15–49.
Sources: DHS figures calculated from DHS country data, standard recode files.
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Figure 5b   Trends in the percentage of children aged 15–19 who completed primary
school, West Africa
Sources: DHS figures calculated from DHS country data, standard recode files.
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can countries in the sample require six years for primary school, except for Madagascar,
which requires only five. All countries in southern and eastern Africa require seven
years, except for Kenya and Malawi, which require eight (UNESCO 1997). Only in the
case of Kenya might the plateau in primary-school completion be attributed at least in
part to reforms in the educational system. The 1985 reform in Kenya changed the re-
quirement for primary school from six to eight years (Husén and Postlethwaite 1994),
and Kenya’s decline from that point on may reflect the difficulty that many children
have in attending school for an additional two years. No other country in the sample
recast its requirements for schooling at the primary level (UNESCO 1997). The stagna-
tion in primary-school completion is probably one manifestation of the economic hard-
ships of the 1980s and early 1990s (see, for example, Ogbu and Gallagher 1991; Reimers
1994; and Grootaert 1994).
The widespread stagnation in the percentage completing four years of education
and in that completing primary school is considered here as background for an evalua-
tion of how these overall trends and patterns are played out by sex. Have these countries
made gains in achieving gender equity in school attendance or in years completed? Has
the recent stagnation, and in some cases declines, in schooling completion adversely
affected girls? Figure 6 presents the ratio of the percentage of female to male students
who completed four or more years of schooling. A ratio of one indicates perfect equity
between boys and girls, a ratio of less than one indicates that a greater percentage of
boys than girls completed four years of school. Only the measure of four years com-
pleted is presented because this measure is directly comparable across countries, but the
trends in gender equity are similar for all three measures of education. Finally, for ease
of presentation, trends in ratios only for a select number of countries are provided. The
countries chosen represent extremes (Mali and Namibia), or they represent several typi-
cal patterns found throughout sub-Saharan Africa.25  Figure 6 shows that for most coun-
tries, increasing number of girls relative to boys have been completing at least four
years of education. This change is as true of countries at low levels of overall comple-
tion (for example, Mali) as it is of countries with relatively high levels of completion
(for example, Kenya). The trends warrant a note of caution, however. Prior to 1990,
what had been driving the ratios toward a value of one (and occasionally beyond) was a
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Figure 6   Trends in the ratio of the percentage of females to the percentage of males aged
15–19 who completed four or more years of schooling, selected countries, sub-Saharan  Africa
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steady increase in levels for both sexes. More recently, however, the proportion of boys
completing four years of school has exhibited no improvement or has shown a down-
ward shift in many countries. The sharp increases in ratios displayed in the graph for
Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Malawi, Namibia, and Tanzania are examples of declin-
ing rates for boys, whereas the rates for girls continue to increase. Rose (1995) notes
that the decline in boys’ enrollment has occurred primarily in those countries participat-
ing in World Bank-supported adjustment programs. Although Rose does not discuss the
factors underlying these trends, we might speculate that, during economically difficult
times, boys may leave school earlier than girls do because of their relatively better op-
portunities for cash employment.
Four countries are chosen here to illustrate patterns of educational differentials
by sex in detail: two in East Africa (Kenya and Tanzania) and two in West Africa (Côte
d’Ivoire and Senegal). In Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal, a gender gap of 20 points and 10
points, respectively, has been sustained in the percentage with at least four years of
schooling (see Figure 7), although both boys and girls stand at well below the 75 percent
mark in both countries. Interestingly, the gap is larger in Côte d’Ivoire even though the
country’s overall levels are higher and the proportion of its government expenditures for
primary education is greater than is the case in Senegal. Recent points of observation
indicate that, in both countries, girls continue a slow trend upward for this measure. In
Côte d’Ivoire, however, boys have reached a plateau, and in Senegal the percentage of
15–19-year-old boys completing at least four years of school has declined slightly to
just over 45 percent. In East Africa, both Kenya and Tanzania show striking trends to-
wards gender equity, and both countries have achieved relatively high levels of four-
year completion (75 percent or greater), even though Tanzania is far poorer than Kenya
and has endured greater economic hardship. Although girls in both countries continue to
make small gains in completing four years of schooling, small declines are found for
boys since the mid-1980s.
Disparities in educational patterns and trends across urban and rural sectors are
also revealing of a government’s commitment to or capacity for providing schooling for
its population.26  Although the majority of the population in all countries under review
still live in rural areas (as shown in Table 1), all have become more urban over time, and
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in six of them, Botswana, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal, South Africa, and Zambia,
at least 40 percent of the population was living in urban areas by 1990. Trends in rural–
urban educational attainment are illustrated in Figure 8. Analogous to Figure 6, this
figure provides ratios of the percentage of rural to urban children completing at least
four years of education. A ratio of one indicates equity between rural and urban popula-
tions, and ratios below one indicate that the percentage of rural 15–19-year-olds who
have completed four years of schooling is less than that for those living in urban areas.
Urban and rural divisions are based on current residence. To the extent that the more
educated rural dwellers tend to migrate to urban areas over time, the measure increas-
ingly will understate educational levels for rural areas at successively earlier dates in the
past and depress the value of the ratio (assuming the additional migrants to the urban
areas do not have a substantial impact on urban educational estimates). As in the analysis of
gender gaps, one measure—those completing at least four years of school—is chosen for a
few select countries, but the patterns of ratios are similar for the other measures of education.
In no country has the gap between rural and urban areas been fully closed. More-
over, the gains shown for narrowing rural to urban disparities do not appear to be as
impressive as the gains for narrowing differences in education by sex. Some countries,
typified by Mali on the graph, appear to have made no progress at all since about 1975
(Burkina Faso and Senegal also fit this characterization), and Malawi and Namibia show
widening disparities between rural to urban levels of those completing at least four years
of school. Furthermore, although most countries have made some progress in reducing
rural–urban gaps, for Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, Nigeria, and Tanzania, the trends toward
unity are driven by declines in school attendance in urban areas. Kenya and South Af-
rica are the two countries closest to achieving similar levels in rural and urban areas for
children completing four years of education. In most countries, however, a substantial
gap between rural and urban schooling has been sustained for three decades, regardless
of level of educational attainment. The gap in most cases is exacerbated in the case of
primary-school completion: Only five countries, Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania, South Af-
rica, and Zimbabwe, have reached the 60 percent level of primary-school completion in
rural areas (numbers not shown), and recent declines are threatening to remove Kenya
and Tanzania from this category.
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Cameroon
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Figure 8   Trends in the ratio of percentage of rural to urban children aged 15–19 who
completed four or more years of schooling, selected countries, sub-Saharan  Africa
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Sources: DHS figures calculated from DHS country data, standard recode files.
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This finding might suggest that access to schooling may be an important con-
straint in rural areas. Filmer and Pritchett (1999) have developed an ingeniously simple
indicator of primary-school access in rural areas—the percentage of rich rural males
aged 15–19 who have completed at least grade 1.27  Using this indicator for 13 of the 17
sub-Saharan African countries considered here, Filmer and Pritchett confirm that access
in rural areas is excellent (more than 90 percent of rich rural males attend school at least
through grade 1) in Cameroon, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and
Zimbabwe, whereas attendance at this level is found to be much less satisfactory in
other countries, with the access gap being most notable in Burkina Faso (60 percent),
Mali (48 percent), and Senegal (42 percent).
In Figure 9, the four case-study countries are used to detail patterns of rural–
urban differentials. Trends in levels of 15–19-year-olds completing at least four years of
schooling are strikingly dissimilar across the four countries. Although all countries show
some progress in improving these levels for both urban and rural areas, in the case of
Kenya, the levels are approaching unity, whereas in Senegal, the absolute gap is widen-
ing. In Côte d’Ivoire and Tanzania, gaps of 20 and 15 percentage points, respectively,
have been more or less sustained over time. Recent observations suggest a decline in
rural areas in Tanzania and a slight decline in urban areas in Kenya. The figure also
shows that patterns are not necessarily a function of overall level of education. Both
Kenya and Tanzania have achieved fairly high levels of education, yet Kenya has suc-
ceeded in closing the rural–urban gap more than has Tanzania. The overall percentage of
those completing four or more years of education is lower for Senegal than for Côte
d’Ivoire (see Figure 4b). Whereas Côte d’Ivoire has managed to sustain similar increases
in education in both rural and urban areas, Senegal appears to have directed the majority
of educational resources to urban areas.
Even as we remain mindful of the possibility that schooling levels and trends
may be slightly exaggerated, we feel confident in concluding that most countries in this
review have made tremendous progress in expanding the primary education for both
boys and girls. These efforts should be applauded, but not at the expense of ignoring
distressing trends. The countries considered have been much less successful in ensuring
that students stay in school for a minimum of four years, let alone that they complete
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primary school, and children in rural areas appear to be substantially shortchanged edu-
cationally relative to their diverse urban counterparts. Although gaps in education for
boys and girls seem to be closing, some countries are facing stagnating or declining
levels of boys’ educational achievement, even while girls continue to lag behind boys
educationally. Most countries are far from providing mass schooling to their popula-
tions, and as a result of war, economic austerity, or high levels of population growth,
some have witnessed stagnation or erosion of the educational gains of earlier decades.
With a few exceptions, the picture of educational breadth and depth in the region is
decidedly grim. Is there a connection between the patterns and trends of education for
children and fertility trends?
IMPLICATIONS OF EDUCATIONAL TRANSITIONS
FOR FERTILITY CHANGE
Although the UN projections would imply that most countries in sub-Saharan
Africa have entered a fertility transition by the late 1990s (Casterline 1999), firm evi-
dence to support many of these projections is lacking. If we rely instead on fertility
estimates from censuses and surveys, particularly the recent Demographic and Health
Surveys, the experience of fertility decline is apparently beginning to spread beyond
many of the countries in southern Africa and Kenya, but the spread is by no means
universal. In particular, evidence suggests the beginnings of a fertility transition in Bots-
wana, Kenya, and Zimbabwe by the late 1980s, and in the case of South Africa, prob-
ably well before then (Cohen 1998; Kirk and Pillet 1998). Although another southern
African country—Namibia—is likely to have embarked on a fertility transition during
the 1980s as well, unfortunately data gathered at various points in time to track that
transition are not yet available. Furthermore, there is now firm evidence from surveys
from the mid-to-late 1990s of moderate to larger fertility declines beginning in the 1990s
for Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, and Senegal as well—the first countries in West
Africa for which such evidence has been found (Cohen 1998; Kirk and Pillet 1998). In
addition, Cohen (1998) presents evidence for small (but ambiguous) declines in overall
total fertility rates for Malawi, Nigeria, Tanzania, and Zambia.28
If we assume that all countries were pretransitional in the early 1960s, we can use
the percentage of decline in fertility as calculated by employing UN estimates of fertil-
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ity for 1960–65 and the most recent TFR as estimated by DHS as roughly comparable
measures of the existence of a fertility decline and the extent of its progress across the
17 countries considered in this study (see Table 5). If a fertility decline of 10 percent is
used as a marker of the beginning of the transition (Bongaarts and Watkins 1996), we
can see that this indicator would identify as pretransitional seven of the 17 countries in
this survey: Burkina Faso, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Nigeria, Uganda, and Zambia. If
we use, instead, current contraceptive prevalence as a marker (fewer than 10 percent of
Table 5 Percentage of married women aged 15–49 currently using contraceptives and
percentage decline in total fertility rate from 1960–65, by country and date of most
recent survey, 17 sub-Saharan countries
Currently using Percent decline in TFR
Country Survey date any contraceptive 1960–65 to present
Botswana 1988 33 29
Burkina Faso 1993 8 1
Cameroon 1998 19 12
Côte d’Ivoire 1994 11 22
Ghana 1998 22 35
Kenya 1998 39 42
Madagascar 1997 19 8
Malawi 1992 13 4
Mali 1995–96 7 6
Namibia 1992 29 10
Nigeria 1990 6 9
Senegal 1997 13 19
South Africa 1987–89 54a 39
Tanzania 1996 18 15
Uganda 1995 15 0
Zambia 1996 26 8
Zimbabwe 1994 48 43
aIncludes currently married, ever lived with a man, ever gave birth, or is currently pregnant.  Based on
estimates from the 1987–89 South African Demographic and Health Survey.
Sources: For all countries except South Africa, individual DHS country reports.  For South Africa,
Human Sciences Research Council (1990).
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currently married women using a contraceptive as pretransitional), we would only include
Burkina Faso, Mali, and Nigeria29  in the pretransitional category.
For the fertility transition to grow and diffuse widely throughout a population,
fertility must begin to fall in rural areas. With the possible exception of South Africa, the
majority of people in the sub-Saharan countries live in rural areas. Levels of urbaniza-
tion vary widely, however, within sub-Saharan Africa, with levels estimated by the UN
in 1990 to be greater than 40 percent in Botswana, Cameroon, Côte-d’Ivoire, Senegal,
South Africa, and Zambia and less than 20 percent in Burkina Faso, Malawi, and Uganda
(as shown in Table 1). Rates of urban growth also vary enormously, from the striking
case of Botswana, where an almost 200 percent increase in urban residence occurred
between 1980 and 1990, to the case of Ghana, where only 9 percent growth in urban
areas has been seen in the last ten years. Levels and trends in urbanization matter pro-
foundly for the fertility transition; in some cases, such as Botswana, rapid trends in
urbanization may be driving the fertility transition.
Currently, among the 17 countries considered in this report, only five have achieved
rural fertility rates lower than six children per woman: Botswana (5.4 in 1988), Ghana (5.4 in
1998), Kenya (5.2 in 1998), South Africa (5.0 for blacks in 1987 to 1989 [Mostert 1990]),
and Zimbabwe (4.9 in 1994) (for all but South Africa, see Table 6). Among the other coun-
tries, where some evidence suggests a fertility transition, direct evidence is available from at
least two independent surveys of gentle to slight declines in rural fertility in Cameroon,
Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. These same countries, however,
show greater declines in urban fertility. All countries in the sample have urban TFRs
lower than six children per woman, and all but Burkina Faso, Malawi, Mali, Nigeria,
Uganda, and Zambia have urban fertility rates lower than five children.
In order to explore more systematically the relationship between mass schooling
and fertility change, the percentage of 15–19-year-olds completing four or more years
of schooling (lagged ten years) is regressed on various markers of the fertility transition
as presented in Table 5: the percentage of decline in fertility from its pretransitional base
(1960–65) and the percentage of all married women (aged 15–49) currently practicing
contraception (see Figures 10 and 11).30  Because Caldwell’s hypothesis implies an ac-
celeration of the decline as mass-schooling levels increase, a quadratic curve is fitted to
this relationship. Both curves support the hypothesized relationships; as levels of mass
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schooling increase, so do levels of fertility change and contraceptive use. The fit is
much better for contraceptive use than it is for fertility, however (the adjusted R-square
is 66 versus 31). This finding could reflect the contraceptive measure’s being relatively
free of error (the percentage of decline in TFR depends on the accuracy of two separate
estimates). Furthermore, contraceptive prevalence is a fairly recent expression of the
extent of deliberate fertility control.
Although we see the expected relationship between educational attainment and
stage of fertility transitions, with the positive relationship between levels of education
and contraceptive use becoming steeper at high levels of education, not all data points
lie along the estimated line (see Figure 11). Among the countries that appear to lag in
terms of contraceptive use, given their level of schooling, are Cameroon, Ghana, Nige-
ria, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. Although we can only speculate at this point about
possible reasons, we might wonder whether poor school quality and the persistence of
linguistic diversity might be factors slowing the process of diffusion. Among the coun-
tries where fertility decline appears to have outstripped schooling achievements are
Botswana, Senegal, South Africa, and Zimbabwe. In the cases of South Africa and Zim-
babwe, near-maximum schooling levels have already been achieved. In the case of Bots-
wana, educational attainment has risen steeply since 1977, the year represented in Fig-
ure 11. Senegal is a particularly interesting case, because it may be a precursor of future
trends in which fertility declines may proceed despite the stagnation of education.
CONCLUSIONS
In most of Africa, the promise embodied in early postindependence progress of
education in which the next generation of African citizens would be universally exposed
to basic levels of formal schooling has yet to be realized. Countries such as Botswana,
Ghana, Kenya, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe are the excep-
tions rather than the rule,31  and most of these had achieved mass schooling by the early
1980s. Although in Cameroon, Madagascar, Malawi, and Uganda, roughly 85 percent
of children have attended school, high rates of attrition prevent many of these children
from attending for more than a few years; thus primary-school completion rates remain
low. The rest of Africa has even farther to go to achieve mass schooling in any meaning-
ful sense.
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Since 1980, growth rates in educational participation and attainment have slowed or
halted; in some countries, these rates have even begun to decline in response to growing
economic difficulties. Although a country’s colonial heritage appears to have had a bearing
on its initial educational investment patterns, educational participation profiles within groups
of countries with common colonial roots have diverged increasingly over time. French West
Africa still appears distinctive in one respect: The rural–urban gap in educational participa-
tion and attainment rates remains wide and shows few signs of narrowing.
In countries at all levels of educational participation and attainment, gender gaps
are closing; in some, they have been essentially eliminated and, in a few cases, reversed
(for example, in Namibia and, most recently, in Madagascar, South Africa, and Tanza-
nia). In earlier years, this trend could be explained by relatively more rapid growth in
educational participation and attainment rates for girls than for boys. More recently, this
trend has been accentuated by a cessation in growth in the rates for boys and, in some
countries, a decline is seen in these rates. In many cases, this closing of the gender gap is
occurring at a point well below the achievement of mass schooling for either girls or boys.
In a recent article, Knodel and Jones (1996) raised questions about the current
international policy emphasis on closing the gender gap in schooling when such rapid
progress has already been made on this front while the gap in education between the rich
and the poor remains wide and neglected.32  The data presented here appear to confirm
their conclusions, at least with respect to the overall gap between rural and urban educa-
tional participation and attainment compared with the overall gap in education between
boys and girls. An exploration of the interaction between gender and socioeconomic
status or urban–rural residence is beyond the scope of this paper. This research would be
a useful next step in assessing the full import of Knodel and Jones’s argument. More-
over, not only do gender gaps in enrollment and attainment persist in the majority of
sub-Saharan countries but also, when boys and girls attend school for the same number
of years, their experiences may be very different. Growing evidence in the education
literature suggests that discriminatory attitudes and behaviors of teachers and fellow
students toward girls may have important long-term negative effects (for example, see
Lloyd et al. 1998). The narrowing of the gender gap in educational attainment or enroll-
ment tells us nothing about the degree of gender equity within schools.
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The most widely used indicator of educational progress—UNESCO’s gross en-
rollment ratio—paints a rosy, but ultimately flawed, picture of earlier progress toward
mass schooling. UNESCO’s data imply that mass schooling was much more widespread
by the early 1980s than, in fact, it was. Variations over time and across countries in the
distribution of ages of entry into primary school and in repetition rates cause the gross
enrollment ratio to be misleading as an indicator of educational progress. Although popu-
lation-based schooling participation rates are preferable to UNESCO’s gross enrollment
ratios, African census data are not easily available for making systematic cross-country
or trend comparisons. Furthermore, published census reports do not use consistent mea-
sures of educational progress, such as the proportion of students completing primary
school, an inconsistency that precludes even the most basic cross-country comparisons.
The increasing availability of educational data from the DHS provided us with
the opportunity to estimate comparable educational participation rates for a large num-
ber of African countries. Census/DHS comparisons for a small subset of countries for
which data were available hint at the possibility that DHS samples may be slightly more
educated, relative to the census, particularly in the younger ages. Thus, the current pic-
ture of educational progress in Africa based on DHS data provided in this study is likely
to be a best-case scenario. This picture has implications not only for our interpretation
of educational trends in Africa but also for the fertility rates derived from DHS data.
The countries in Africa that have achieved mass schooling by all three criteria—
Botswana, Kenya, Namibia, South Africa, Zambia, and Zimbabwe—are also in the fore-
front of the fertility transition if it is measured by the percentage of married women
currently using contraceptives. Cameroon, Ghana, and Tanzania have made substantial
strides in education as well, although none of these countries has yet reached 90 percent
enrollment overall. In these three countries, contraceptive-use rates range from 18 to 22
percent, indicating the strong beginning of a fertility transition. By way of contrast,
some countries, including Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal, have not approached 90 percent
attendance in primary school or 60 percent primary-school completion, and yet their
estimated fertility declines appear impressive (22 and 19 percent, respectively). Contra-
ceptive use in both of these countries remains relatively low, however (11 and 13 per-
cent, respectively), suggesting that the fertility transition is beginning primarily through
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a rise in age at marriage. Furthermore, they are relatively more highly urbanized and recently
both have reached mass-schooling levels in urban areas. Evidence is suggestive of rapid
declines in urban fertility with much gentler declines in rural areas. The pace of the transition
may depend more on the rates of urbanization in such settings than it does in others.
In light of recent setbacks in the growth of educational participation rates at pri-
mary-school levels, caused either by recent declines or by a plateauing of levels at rates
that fall below mass schooling, the key question remaining is: What are the prospects
for future fertility decline in a context of educational stagnation both for countries that
have already begun the fertility transition and for those that have not yet begun? Once
begun, are future fertility declines inevitable, even in the absence of further educational
progress? Can we reasonably expect Africans to limit their fertility even if they see no
prospect that their children will have a chance to complete primary school or, in some
places, attend school at all? Will there be a “quantity” transition without a “quality”
transition? Will the emergence of national language and culture through the influence of
the mass media transform the role of education in fertility transitions as suggested by
Watkins (1991)? To answer these questions, we can draw a few insights from past expe-
rience. A cautionary note is in order, however: Development has been experienced tradi-
tionally as a steady and irreversible process; contemporary African experience has no
historical analog.
Although relatively few sub-Saharan countries were included in Bongaarts and
Watkins’s (1996) analysis of the timing and pace of the fertility transition in developing
countries, they find that, for Asia, Latin America, and some of Africa, the more recent
the fertility transition, the lower the level of development at the time it began, a finding
that supports a hypothesis of social interaction and diffusion across borders. Although
the human development index (HDI) does not contain a measure of children’s school-
ing—it records only adult literacy—Bongaarts and Watkins also find that the higher the
level of the HDI at the beginning of the transition, the more rapid the subsequent fall in
fertility. This finding might imply that although fertility transitions can begin in Africa
at lower levels of development than were necessary in the past, the pace of decline will
be more leisurely if mass schooling has not been achieved, because the mechanisms in
place for social interaction and diffusion, including a common national language, are
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more limited. On the other hand, high rates of population growth and the youthful age
structure of the population make the achievement of mass schooling in the presence of
high fertility much more difficult, increasing the likelihood that fertility decline in the
future will precede the achievement of mass schooling. Thus, in the future, mass school-
ing may be a less essential precondition for fertility decline than it has been in the past,
especially as other forms of mass communication spread across the continent. However,
formal schooling will surely remain an important mechanism of “demographic integra-
tion” (Watkins 1991: 45).
Caldwell’s review of the historical record stressed the importance in that experi-
ence of the enforcement of compulsory schooling laws for the full attainment of mass
schooling in the West. Most countries in Africa have such laws on the books. In this time
of financial stringency in Africa, when the short-run prospects for further improvements
in educational resources on the supply side are limited, particularly considering the con-
tinuing growth in the numbers of school-age populations, how can school enrollment
and educational attainment be further increased? Parents are mostly poor, and schooling
can be costly. Moreover, few African states have outreach capacity at the local level
sufficient to force children to attend school. One alternative to compulsory education in
a resource-thin environment is an affordable education information campaign similar to
many successful family planning information campaigns launched in the past. Billboards,
radio, and television could be used to inform parents of the importance of sending their
children to school and of doing so at the recommended school-starting age. The cam-
paign also could encourage parents’ involvement and participation in dialogues at the
community level so that school schedules could be devised that are respectful of their
needs. The payoffs of such an investment could be enormous in helping fulfill national
goals of basic education. Such an information program could also strengthen the posi-
tive payoffs to couples of substituting quality for quantity by reducing their family size
and increasing their commitment to basic schooling for all their children.
Notes
1 This inaccessibility of data is expected to change in the near future as a result of
the African census project spearheaded by Tukufu Zuberi at the University of
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Pennsylvania in collaboration with the African Population and Health Research
Center (APHRC) and the census offices of many African countries.
2 The selection of countries included ten that had both DHS and comparable cen-
sus data available on education with which to check data quality and coverage
(Cameroon, Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Malawi, Namibia, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia,
and Zimbabwe). These choices were supplemented with countries that have popu-
lations of at least eight million (for example, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Mada-
gascar, Nigeria, Senegal, and South Africa) and with countries having small popu-
lations but which also appear to have declining levels of fertility (for example,
Botswana). Five countries that had no DHS data available met the size criteria
for inclusion: Angola, Congo (formerly Zaire), Ethiopia, Mozambique, and South
Africa. Alternative sources of data were sought for these five countries, but the
search was successful only in the case of South Africa, for which we use Living
Standard Measurement Survey (LSMS)-type data collected by the University of
Cape Town and the World Bank in 1993—the South African Living Standards
Survey. Even though the sample of countries is dominated by those with British
or French colonial traditions, it demonstrates the diversity of educational pat-
terns in the region.
3 Axinn (1993) also explored the relationship between children’s schooling and
fertility in one village in Nepal. He found that whether parents sent their oldest
child to school had a statistically significant effect on parents’ ever use of contra-
ceptives and on their desire for more children. He found similar results for the
proportion of children sent to school. Because the study was conducted in only
one village, however, it cannot be viewed as a test of Caldwell’s mass-schooling
hypothesis. Furthermore, in light of the endogenous nature of fertility and school-
ing at the household level, problems are encountered in interpreting causality.
4 This finding is based on a comparative analysis across regions, controlling for
other factors including income, teachers’ salaries, and population distribution.
5 This description does not treat separately the brief but important colonial Ger-
man presence in what is now Namibia and Tanzania. German forms of colonial
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education were similar to the French, emphasizing a central educational policy
for a very few. The Germans lost their African colonies after World War I when
Tanzania became a “mandated territory” of the British and South Africa was
awarded responsibility for Namibia. In Tanzania, little changed in educational
policy at first, with government schools continuing operations. Over time, in-
creased numbers of missionaries founded schools. By independence in 1961,
Tanzania was still much more mixed in terms of public and religious institutions
than were other British colonies (see Cameron 1970). The Namibian system even-
tually evolved to resemble the South African system, also with a mix of public
and missionary schools until the mid-1950s, when missionary schools were taken
over by the government.
6 Prior to independence, educational systems went through a number of changes
and transitions that cannot be adequately addressed within the scope of this pa-
per. See Uchendu (1979), Duffy (1961), Yansané (1985), and Cowan et al. (1965).
7 The goal of universal primary school by 1980 was proclaimed at the 1961 Con-
ference of African States at Addis Ababa attended by African education minis-
ters.
8 An index of ethnolinguistic fractionalization has been constructed measuring the
probability that two citizens being chosen at random will come from different
ethnolinguistic groups. By this measure, the average African country is two times
more fractionalized than are other developing regions (Collier and Gunning 1999).
9 The development of a national curriculum was intended to create unity within the
African state, overcoming the factional and centrifugal pressures of tribal, lin-
guistic, and cultural distinctions and demands.
10 This statement is based on an assessment of the extent of educational reforms
that have occurred in the sample of countries considered here, using a recent
review of systems of education worldwide (Husén and Postlethwaite 1994).
11 In addition, Zimbabwe made significant investments in education after becoming
independent in 1980; these investments represented 11.4 percent of its GNP in 1990.
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12 Many of the former French colonies maintained relatively high salaries for teach-
ers, leading to higher costs per pupil (as shown in Table 2).
13 Botswana, Cameroon, and South Africa are exceptions.
14 The breakdown is not known for South Africa, because the allocation for general
secondary schooling is combined with that for primary education.
15 The age range is country-specific; in each case, the lower-age boundary is the
normal entrance age and the upper-age boundary is the starting age plus the num-
ber of years in the primary-school cycle.
16 Two-thirds of the weight of this component is given to literacy rates and one-third to
a combined gross enrollment rating covering all three levels of schooling. The other
two HDI components are longevity and real GDP per capita (in US$ adjusted for
purchasing power parity).
17 Ages 10–11 are those at which attendance rates peak in all countries, resulting
from delayed ages of entry. Even in systems with no more than five grades of
primary school, the assumption that all 10–11-year-olds in school are still attend-
ing primary school is reasonable.
18 The collection of African census materials from Northwestern University is com-
pared with the census collection at the University of Texas and found to have had
equal coverage of recent censuses in Africa. The collection from Northwestern
University is used here.
19 In every case, the DHS survey occurred after the census. The gap in years ranged
from one year for Namibia to nine years for Ghana.
20 The 1980 United Nations Principles and Recommendations for Population and
Housing Censuses stated, “Educational attainment refers primarily to the highest
grade completed [emphasis added] within the most advanced level attended . . . ”
(United Nations 1980: 86). The 1998 United Nations Revision of the Principles
and Recommendations for Population and Housing Censuses states unequivo-
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cally that “Educational attainment is defined as the highest grade completed within
the most advanced level. . . . Some countries may also [emphasis added] find it
useful to present data on educational attainment in terms of highest grade at-
tended.” (United Nations 1998c: 76).
21 Thomas and Muvandi (1994) found that the 1994 Zimbabwe DHS had a slightly
more educated sample of women than would have been predicted on the basis of
an earlier survey, with the implication that the DHS in Zimbabwe might have
drawn a sample that was slightly overeducated.
22 Barro and Lee (1996) have developed a cross-national database on the educa-
tional attainment of the adult population drawing upon census surveys and
UNESCO data. Because this database is not broken down by age group, how-
ever, these data cannot be used to look at trends in enrollment and attainment by
five-year cohorts.
23 In contrast to Filmer and Pritchett (1999), who grouped together those who never
attended and those attended but did not complete even one grade, all those who
attended school are grouped here in the “ever attended” category, even if they
attended for less than a year.
24 Although some concern is expressed that the proportions completing primary
school in Kenya and Zimbabwe might not be precisely estimated given discrep-
ancies between DHS data and the most recent census, this bias is not likely to
affect the conclusion given here concerning progress toward mass schooling.
25 Countries were chosen to represent various levels of education, geographic range,
colonial experience, and trends in educational equity according to gender.
26 One serious problem with such a comparison is that definitions of “urban” vary
by country. Most urbanites in sub-Saharan Africa live in settlements with fewer
than half a million inhabitants, and a large minority live in very small settlements
that are essentially rural centers. Furthermore, the extent of urban primacy, or the
concentration of wealth and public resources in the largest agglomeration is more
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pronounced in sub-Saharan Africa than in any other region of the world. Thus,
the category “urban” may encompass a huge range of living conditions (Brocker-
hoff 1999).
27 Many “rich rural males,” particularly in Africa, may migrate to cities to attend
school, staying with urban relatives, however, so this indicator may slightly over-
estimate the actual degree of access they have to schooling.
28 Moreover, Kirk and Pillet (1998) use the birth histories from the most recent
DHS to demonstrate evidence of fertility decline for younger women (aged 15–
34) in Madagascar, Malawi, Tanzania, and Uganda.
29 The most recent national data for Nigeria are from 1990.
30 South Africa is not included in this regression. An estimate of contraceptive use
is available only for the black population.
31 Ghana and Tanzania are included in this list because, although they fall below the
mass-schooling threshold for basic enrollment, they surpass the threshold for 4+
and primary-school completion.
32 The existence of large gaps in educational attainment between rich and poor has
been recently and systemically documented by Filmer and Pritchett (1999) using
DHS data. These gaps are particularly striking in western and central Africa.
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